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Eficienta sanctiunilor dispuse de autoritatile de concurenta în cazurile antitrust

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  • PRISECARU, Paul

    (Consiliul Concurentei)

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    Abstract

    One of the least studied aspects of antitrust law and economics is the effectiveness of public sanctions in deterring anticompetitive behavior. Recent studies regarding overcharges in cartel cases have demonstrated that the classic ”maximum 10% of annual turnover” fine may have only remote efficiency. Comparatively, cartels are in place more that a year and usually generate profits in excess of 10% of annual turnover. Moreover, empirical evidence demonstrates that jurisdictions where criminal penalties are used against individuals involved in antitrust cases, such as United States, are more efficient in deterring the use of anticompetitive behavior to enhance profits. Although, in recent years antitrust fines have been growing significantly, competition policy in Romania remains weak, based on empirical evidence from two of the most important cases enforced by the Romanian Competition Council.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by National Institute of Economic Research in its series Studii Economice with number 130221.

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    Length: 27 pages
    Date of creation: Feb 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ror:seince:130221

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    Related research

    Keywords: antitrust; sanctions; effectiveness; fines; prices; cartel; overcharge;

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