Eficienta sanctiunilor dispuse de autoritatile de concurenta în cazurile antitrust
AbstractOne of the least studied aspects of antitrust law and economics is the effectiveness of public sanctions in deterring anticompetitive behavior. Recent studies regarding overcharges in cartel cases have demonstrated that the classic ”maximum 10% of annual turnover” fine may have only remote efficiency. Comparatively, cartels are in place more that a year and usually generate profits in excess of 10% of annual turnover. Moreover, empirical evidence demonstrates that jurisdictions where criminal penalties are used against individuals involved in antitrust cases, such as United States, are more efficient in deterring the use of anticompetitive behavior to enhance profits. Although, in recent years antitrust fines have been growing significantly, competition policy in Romania remains weak, based on empirical evidence from two of the most important cases enforced by the Romanian Competition Council.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Institute of Economic Research in its series Studii Economice with number 130221.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
antitrust; sanctions; effectiveness; fines; prices; cartel; overcharge;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Corina Saman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.