This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

On the Relative Efficiency of Democratic Institutions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Zimmermann, Klaus W. () (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg)
Just, Tobias () (Deutsche Bank Research)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Strengthening elements of direct democracy has become a hotly debated issue especially in purely representative democracies where distrust in political institutions and policymakers has been continually growing in recent years. We develop a compensation model of interest groups seeking a majority for their projects by compensating potential losers. Assuming a centre-left government backed by a parliamentary majority, we apply the model to interest groups of varying size and ideology acting in democratic systems with and without faction discipline. With faction discipline in a representative system, direct democracy is comparatively advantageous and efficiency-enhancing if a leftist interest group initiates a project. For rightist project proposals, direct democracy performs better only if the winning group is small; this obeservation that indirect democracy has a comparative efficiency advantage for medium-sized and large winning groups can be seen as a demonstration of Olson´s encompassing group effect. With faction discipline removed, direct and indirect democracy are generally equivalent. The case in which all members of the governing faction have to be compensated constitutes the only exception for which indirect democracy is superior.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.hsu-hh.de/fgvwl/index_Twr6JzjZmD8zkLca.html
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg in its series Working Paper with number 16/2003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2003_016

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Holstenhofweg 85, D-22043 Hamburg
Phone: +49 (0)40 6541 2590
Fax: +49 (0)40 6541 2780
Web page: http://www.hsu-hh.de/fgvwl/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Kai Hielscher).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
P17 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Performance and Prospects

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also computes impact factors for journals and working paper series.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.