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Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains

Author

Listed:
  • Chatterji, Shurojit

    (School of Economics, Singapore Management University)

  • Zeng, Huaxia

    (Lingnan College, Sun Yat-Sen University)

Abstract

We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to establish a particular class of top-separable domains: connected domains, and show that in the class of minimally rich and connected domains, the multidimensional single-peakedness restriction is necessary and sufficient for the design of a flexible random social choice function that is unanimous and strategy-proof. Such a fl exible function is distinct from generalized random dictatorships in that it allows for a systematic notion of compromise. Our characterization remains valid (under an additional hypothesis) for a problem of voting with constraints where not all alternatives are feasible (Barbera et al., 1997).

Suggested Citation

  • Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2017. "Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 17-2017, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:smuesw:2017_017
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Generalized random dictatorships; Top-separable domains; Connected domains; Multidimensional single-peaked domains; Constrained voting.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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