Regionalism Cycle in Asia (-Pacific): A Game Theory Approach to the Rise and Fall of Asian Regional Institutions
AbstractDespite a commonplace view that Asian regionalism lacks institutions, Asia, in fact, is full of regional institutions and frameworks in various forms. The rise and fall of regional institutions in Asia is an extremely dynamic process. Using a game theory approach, this paper hypothesizes that the dynamic nature of Asian regionalism can be explained by a "regionalism cycle." The institutional outcome of regionalism in Asia has been cyclical because the game played by Japan and the United States does not have a stable equilibrium. This paper tests the hypothesized regionalism cycle using actual cases of regional institutions in the field of financial cooperation and regional summit meetings.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Asian Development Bank in its series Working Papers on Regional Economic Integration with number 42.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2010
Date of revision:
regionalism; Regionalism cycle; Asian Monetary Fund (AMF); East Asia Summit (EAS); Game Theory;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
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