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Tax reform on the brink of fiscal dominance: a political economy model

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  • Rogério Ladeira Furquim Werneck

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    (Department of Economics PUC-Rio)

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    Abstract

    With an overindebted public-sector, Brazil has been on the brink of a fiscal dominance problem for quite a long time. The term has been usually associated to a situation in which monetary policy becomes subordinated to fiscal needs. This paper calls attention to broader implications of prolonged exposure to impending fiscal dominance. A highdebt environment may make perfectly reasonable fiscal-reform initiatives seem extremely risky. Without any room to absorb revenue losses, in a complex fiscalfederalism arrangement, the government is bound to recurrently see badly needed tax reform, which could lead to a much less distorting tax system, as an unaffordable adventure. The paper is structured in the following way. The next section presents stylized facts that have been underlying a whole decade of unsuccessful tax-reform attempts in Brazil. Section 3 shows how the combination of those facts creates very unfavorable conditions for the approval of the kind of tax reform the country needs. A simple political economy model is developed in section 4. Simulations based on the model are analyzed in sections 5 and 6. Concluding remarks are presented in the last section.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil) in its series Textos para discussão with number 505.

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    Length: 18p
    Date of creation: Aug 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:rio:texdis:505

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    Keywords: tax reform; public debt; fiscal dominance; political economy; federalism; Brazil;

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