On the Desirability to Switch from a Standard Unemployment Insurance Program to a System of Unemployment Accounts
AbstractThis paper uses a heterogeneous agent model with liquidity constrained workers subject to employment shocks to study the feasibility of a system of unemployment accounts with the example of Oregon under various moral hazard scenarios. We determine the optimal policy parameter vector and compare outcomes with (optimal) unemployment insurance and self-insurance. We expand also the model to take into account skill heterogeneity across agents. We find that unemployment accounts are prefered with even small levels of moral hazard.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2010 Meeting Papers with number 772.
Date of creation: 2010
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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