Preemption Games with Private Information
AbstractPreemption games are widely used to model economic problems such as patent races. We introduce private information into these games and allow for this information to stochastically change over time. This reflects, e.g. how R&D competitors improve their innovations over time and keep these innovations secret before patenting them. The analysis initially appears intractable because of the complexity of the equilibrium updating of beliefs on opponents' information. However, we demonstrate the existence of a class of equilibria and calculate these equilibria in closed form. We find that the expected durations in these equilibria are longer than when players' information is public but, in some cases, shorter than in the collusive outcome. Hence, R&D secrecy slows down innovation disclosure. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2005 Meeting Papers with number 80.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC
timing games; patent races; private information;
Other versions of this item:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ufuk Akcigit & Qingmin Liu, 2011. "The Role of Information in Competitive Experimentation," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Bobtcheff, Catherine & Bolte, Jérôme & Mariotti, Thomas, 2013. "Researcher's Dilemma," IDEI Working Papers 763, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Aureo de Paula, 2004.
"Inference in a Synchronization Game with Social Interactions,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
07-017, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 May 2007.
- de Paula, Áureo, 2009. "Inference in a synchronization game with social interactions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 56-71, January.
- Morgan, John, 2004.
"Clock Games: Theory and Experiments,"
Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt81m0r0jj, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Brunnermeier, Markus K & Morgan, John, 2006. "Clock Games: Theory and Experiments," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9c11m09n, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Markus K Brunnermeier & John Morgan, 2004. "Clock Games: Theory and Experiments," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000401, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ufuk Akcigit & Qingmin Liu, 2011. "The Role of Information in Competitive Experimentation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000321, David K. Levine.
- Francis Bloch & Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2011.
"Learning and Collusion in New Markets with Uncertain Entry Costs,"
- Francis Bloch & Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2011. "Learning and Collusion in New Markets with Uncertain Entry Costs," Working Papers 1112, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2011.
- Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady, 2013.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000635, David K. Levine.
- Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 2012. "Breakdowns," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 396, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2013. "Innovation in a generalized timing game," Working Papers 2013-16, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Ufuk Akcigit & Qingmin Liu, 2011. "The Role of Information in Competitive Experimentation," NBER Working Papers 17602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bobtcheff, Catherine & Mariotti, Thomas, 2012. "Potential competition in preemption games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 53-66.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.