Competition and Sovereign Risk
AbstractIs increased competition in international financial markets desirable? On the one hand, reductions in mnopoly power can be efficiency improving. On the other, increased competition may make it hard to coordinate in disciplining debtors in default. This paper presents a model that formalizes this intuition, and applies it to study the recent shift from bank loans toward bond lending.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2004 Meeting Papers with number 6.
Date of creation: 2004
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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Competition; Sovereign Debt; Default Risk;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
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- Marc Flandreau, 2013. "Collective Action Clauses before they had Airplanes: Bondholder Committees and the London Stock Exchange in the 19th Century (1827-1868)," IHEID Working Papers 01-2013, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
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