Public Goods with Congestion: A Mechanism Design Approach
AbstractI consider the problem of the efficient provision of a public good with congestion in a setting with asymmetric information. I show, in particular, that when congestion is taken into account, in a wide class of economies it is possible to construct an incentive compatible mechanism that always produces the good at the efficient level, balances the budget and satisfies voluntary participation constraints. This result is in contrast with the corresponding impossibility result for pure public goods due to Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and Rob (1989)
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2004 Meeting Papers with number 139.
Date of creation: 2004
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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public goods; congestion; efficiency; budget balance; voluntary participation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2004-08-02 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2004-08-02 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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