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Faut-il ou non interdire la discrimination ?

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Author Info
Caprice, S.
Abstract

In this paper, we explain the ambiguous impact of a rule of non-discrimination on the relationships between manufacturers and retailers. We show that such a rule has two conflicting effects on the Formation and the sharing of profits between upstream and downstream firms. We study these elements taking into account the development of own brands by retailers or more commonly the presence of alternate sources of supply. We show that a rule of non-discrimination effectively improves the profit of a producer, but can reduce the wholesale prices and the final prices. Such a rule, when the goods are stongly substitutes, implies a decrease of retailers' profits. ...French Abstract : Cet article montre dans le cadre des relations entre producteurs et distributeurs qu'une règle de non-discrimination exerce des effets opposés sur la formation et le partage du profit entre les secteurs amont et aval. L'auteur propose un modèle permettant d'appréhender ces éléments en prenant explicitement en compte la présence de marques de distributeurs ou, plus généralement, de sources alternatives d'approvisionnement. Il montre, en particulier, qu'une règle de non-discrimination renforce effectivement le pouvoir de marché d'un fournisseur, mais ne conduit pas nécessairement à une augmentation des prix de gros et des prix de détail. Par ailleurs, une telle règle peut permettre de réduire le pouvoir de négociation des distributeurs.

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File URL: http://www.toulouse.inra.fr/centre/esr/wpRePEc/cap200114.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse) in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) with number 27.

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Length: 10 p.
Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:rea:inrawp:27

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Related research
Keywords: MULTILATERAL VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS STORE BRAND DISCRIMINATION NONDISCRIMINATION RELATION INDUSTRIE DISTRIBUTION MARQUE DE DISTRIBUTEUR CONTRAT DISTRIBUTION

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  3. Paul Dobson & Michael Waterson, 1999. "Retailer power: recent developments and policy implications," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 14(28), pages 133-164, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Caprice, S., 2001. "Marques de distribution et rapports de force entre producteurs et distributeurs," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 29, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]
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