Competition policy and agreements between firms
AbstractThe European Commission recently considered abolishing the notification system and focusing on a regime of ex-post investigations. Our objective is to show that a better understanding of markets can justify this reform. Whe the precision of the Competition Authority's analysis is not high enough, a ex-ante control, like the notification system, is preferable. On the other hand, if the decision accuracy improves, an ex-post investigation regime achieves a higher social welfare. ...French Abstract : La Commission Européenne a récemment décidé de mettre fin au système de notifications et de recentrer ses activités sur un régime d'enquêtes. L'objectif des auteurs est de montrer qu'une meilleure connaissance des marchés justifie une telle réforme. Lorsque l'analyse des dossiers faite par l'Aurorité de la Concurrence n'est pas suffisamment minutieuse, un controle ex-ante est préférable (comme le système des notifications). En revanche, quand la qualité de jugement s'améliore, un régime ex-post d'enquêtes permet d'atteindre un surplus social plus élevé.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse) in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) with number 22.
Length: 38 p.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Postal: INRA ESR - BP27 - 31326 Castanet Tolosan cedex - France
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-10-22 (All new papers)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Canoy, M.F.M. & Rey, P. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 2004.
"Dominance and Monopolization,"
2004-022, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Le Pape, Nicolas & Zhao, Kai, 2013. "Horizontal mergers and uncertainty," Economics Discussion Papers 2013-62, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RAYNAL Helene).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.