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Signaling Motives in Lying Games

Author

Listed:
  • Fries, Tilman

    (WZB Berlin)

Abstract

This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some types of liars are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium prediction of the model can explain experimental data from previous studies, in particular on partial lying, where some agents dishonestly report a non payo

Suggested Citation

  • Fries, Tilman, 2021. "Signaling Motives in Lying Games," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 269, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:269
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    File URL: https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/269.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lying; image concerns; honesty; experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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