IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/qed/wpaper/991.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation For Reduction Of Envy

Author

Listed:
  • Yukihiro Nishimura

    (Yokohama National University and Queen's University)

Abstract

This paper examines the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem based on Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson's (1990) λ-equitability in a two-class economy. An allocation is λ-equitable if no agent envies a proportion λ of the bundle of any other agent. We examine the properties of Pareto undominated allocations for various λ-equitability requirements. When there is one output, the marginal income tax rate can increase only if (but not if) leisure is a luxury. In a multi-commodity model with commodity taxes, the goods preferred by the low skilled agent and/or of high Hicksian elasticities are taxed more heavily.

Suggested Citation

  • Yukihiro Nishimura, 2000. "Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation For Reduction Of Envy," Working Paper 991, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:991
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_991.pdf
    File Function: First version 2000
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Income Taxation; Envy;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:991. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mark Babcock (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/qedquca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.