Continuous Time Repeated Games of Complete Information
AbstractThis paper provides a formulation of continuous time repeated games of complete information. A substantial part of the paper is concerned with the definition of a continuous time strategy and the association of outcomes to strategies. The set of equilibria relative to these strategies is characterized in the remainder of the paper.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 706.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1987
Date of revision:
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