Ex Post Versus Ex Ante Optimal Policies for Risky Activities
AbstractThis paper analyzes government policy when random shocks affect particular industries, occupations or regions. Workers can freely choose and industry or occupation ex ante, and can relocate at a cost, once uncertainty is resolved. The policy instruments available are per capita taxes and subsidies. These are chosen either to maximize ex post utilitarian aggregate welfare, or to maximize ex ante expected utility of a representative worker. Optimal policies range from complete equalization of net incomes across workers to no equalizing transfers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 676.
Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 1986
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Boadway, R.W. & Wildasin, D.E., 1987. "Ex post versus ex ante optimal policies for risky activities," CORE Discussion Papers 1987038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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