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A Panel Bargaining Model within the Regional Boundaries of the South African Grain Industry

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Author Info
Elizabeth M. Ueckermann (Department of Economics, University of Pretoria)
James N. Blignaut (Department of Economics, University of Pretoria)
Rangan Gupta () (Department of Economics, University of Pretoria)

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Abstract

The present study defines the bargaining process undertaken between a large number of heterogeneous farmers and a few intermediaries within the deregulated South African grain industry. Based on this process, an outcome was obtained by means of the application of a seemingly unrelated cross-sectional regression model utilising regional panel data relating to the years from 2000 to 2005. The results indicate that the bargaining game yields more efficient results in all the regions for all the market players and to an even greater extent when interregional bargaining takes place. The authors of the present paper suggest that this type of bargaining instrument can serve as a planning tool for the grain producers in order to strengthen their bargaining position in the new free-market environment.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Pretoria, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 200706.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pre:wpaper:200706

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Postal: PRETORIA, 0002
Phone: (+2712) 420 2413
Fax: (+2712) 362-5207
Web page: http://web.up.ac.za/default.asp?ipkCategoryID=40
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Related research
Keywords: non-cooperative games; panel data;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Blair, Roger D & Kaserman, David L, 1987. "A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula Price Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 460-63, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Im, Kyung So & Pesaran, M. Hashem & Shin, Yongcheol, 2003. "Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 53-74, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Jayne, T.S. & Hajek, Milan & van Zyl, Johan, 1995. "An Analysis Of Alternative Maize Marketing Policies In South Africa," Food Security III Papers 11348, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sophie Thoyer & Sylvie Morardet & Patrick Rio & Leo Simon & Rachel Goodhue & Gordon Rausser, 2001. "A Bargaining Model to Simulate Negotiations Between Water Users," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4. [Downloadable!]
  5. Winter, Eyal, 1994. "The Demand Commitment Bargaining and Snowballing Cooperation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 255-73, March.
  6. Brent Hueth & Philippe Marcoul, 2006. "Information Sharing and Oligopoly in Agricultural Markets: The Role of the Cooperative Bargaining Association," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 88(4), pages 866-881, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Seierstad, Atle & Sydsaeter, Knut, 1977. "Sufficient Conditions in Optimal Control Theory," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 18(2), pages 367-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Jihong Lee & Hamid Sabourian, 2005. "Efficiency in Negotiation: Complexity and Costly Bargaining," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0505, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
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