The social norm of leaving the toilet seat down: A game theoretic analysis
AbstractWe model the toilet seat problem as a 2 player non-cooperative game. We find that the social norm of leaving the toilet seat down is inefficient. However, to the dismay of “mankind”, we also find that the social norm of leaving the seat down after use is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. Hence, sadly, this norm is not likely to go away.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 856.
Date of creation: 16 Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Trembling-hand perfection; social norm;
Other versions of this item:
- Hammad Siddiqi, 2006. "The social norm of leaving the toilet seat down: A game theoretic analysis," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(13), pages A0.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-12-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2006-12-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2006-12-04 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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