Truth in Economic Subjectivism
AbstractThe notion of subjectivism has a significant place in the body of economic theory, most notably in the theory of economic value. There is, however, one concern that some philosophers have raised about truth in normative judgments that puts economic subjectivism seriously into question. This concern can be articulated as the following question: Do economic value judgments have truth values? The answer to this question is pertinent not only for an improved understanding of economic value but also for such philosophical investigations as realism, epistemology, ontology, and ethics. Nonetheless, the answer is not readily available in the body of economic theory. This paper argues that the truth or falsity of economic judgments can be settled objectively.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5568.
Date of creation: Oct 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Markets and Morality 2.1(1998): pp. 158-168
subjective economic value; subjectivism; objectivism; economic judgments; moral realism; social ontology; philosophy of economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
- N01 - Economic History - - General - - - Development of the Discipline: Historiographical; Sources and Methods
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