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A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results

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  • Bimonte, Giovanna
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    Abstract

    It is well known that in a differential information economy the free coalition formation may imply some theoretical difficulties. It does not suffice to say that a coalition can be formed by several agents. We define a set of all possible coalitions as the set of those coalitions that can be formed and joint by any agent. There exists, in this way, a rule imposed over coalition formation. We assume that only a subset $\mathcal{S}$ of $\Sigma$ is alowed to form. In such way, we fix over the set of agents an aggregation rule for which the coalitions can be formed only if they belong to this subset. We have restricted the set of coalitions that can be joined by traders. The main result is the equivalence between two private core concept: the classical one for a differential information economy and the private core restricted.

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    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 46283.

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    Date of creation: 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:46283

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    Keywords: Differential information economy; restriction on coalition formation; private core.;

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    1. Giovanna Bimonte & Maria Graziano, 2009. "The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 331-350, February.
    2. Okuda, Hidesuke & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1985. "Core allocations and the dimension of the cone of efficiency price vectors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 166-171, February.
    3. Schmeidler, David, 1972. "A Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 579-80, May.
    4. Vind, Karl, 1972. "A Third Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 585-86, May.
    5. Khan, M Ali, 1974. "Some Equivalence Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 549-65, October.
    6. Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1973. "Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 467-501, May.
    7. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1983. "A core equivalence theorem with an arbitrary communication structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 43-55, January.
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