L’evoluzione dei patti sociali in una prospettiva analitica
[The evolution of social pacts: An analytical perspective]
AbstractIn this paper we revisit the case for corporatist agreements in a model where labor markets are unionized, the government controls the fiscal stance, and an independent central bank sets monetary policy. We can then analyze the scope for a political exchange between public expenditure and wage setting choices, showing that corporatism may generate quite different macroeconomic outcomes from the traditional exchange between wage restraint and high public expenditure. In fact our model can easily encompass both first and second-generation corporatist agreements.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4436.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Corporatism; trade unions; fiscal policy; monetary conservativeness; policy game;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
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