Let's make the tax system more lovable
AbstractMaking the taxes acceptable to large number of people by allocating their obligation to the chosen project is the main subject of this paper. In this way a greater objectivity, transparency and local goals are set in according to the preferences of the tax contributors. State Investment office prevents the rule of invisible hand of market by allocation part of tax money to the less developed regions reducing difference between them.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3151.
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
tax; principal agent problem; welfare;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2007-05-26 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2007-05-26 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2007-05-26 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-PUB-2007-05-26 (Public Finance)
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