Об Одной Модели Перераспределения Ресурсов
[A Model of Resource Redistribution]
AbstractConsider an economy with n resources (goods) and m agents, and let initial resource allocation be given. We ask if it is possible to build a mutually beneficial bargaining sequence that approaches an optimal resource allocation even though a) only k ≤ n agents participates at each step of the bargaining sequence, and b) they use only information about participants of the exchange. We answer this question using a new concept of quasi - summator functions. In particular, the answer is positive if k > n and all agent utility functions are concave.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 22205.
Date of creation: 1970
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics and Mathematical Methods / Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody 4.6(1970): pp. 583-593
bargain (exchange); resource redistribution (reallocation); Khelli's Theorem; deadlock point; quasi-summator function;
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- Madden, Paul J, 1975. "Efficient Sequences of Non-Monetary Exchange," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 581-96, October.
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