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Corruption Factors

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  • Polterovich, Victor

Abstract

Among the factors that give rise to corruption, it is suggested that three groups be distinguished: fundamental factors rooted in the imperfection of economic institutions and economic policy, organizational factors ("weakness of the government"), and societal factors that depend on the prehistory and are connected with the mass culture and norms of bureaucratic behavior. A model in which corruption equilibrium is supported by non-optimum tax policy or by slow technical progress is compared with a "societal" model, which has two Nash equilibria of the level of corruption. Recommendations for combating corruption stemming from analysis of the models are discussed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20958.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Publication status: Published in Matekon 4.34(1998): pp. 3-15
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20958

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Related research

Keywords: corruption equilibrium; norms of bureaucratic behavior; Nash equilibrium; imperfection of economic institutions;

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Cited by:
  1. Levin Mark & Movshovich Solomon, 2001. "Tax Evasion Modeling under Penalties and Refusal of Banks to Grant Loan," EERC Working Paper Series 99-306e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.

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