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On the Truly Noncooperative Game of Island Life II: Evolutionary Stable Economic Development Strategy in Brief

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Author Info
Funk, Matt

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Abstract

This paper offers a solution to 'The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development' on islands. This hypothesis offers a foundational, sub-game solution to The Island Survival Game, a counterintuitive, dominant economic development strategy for ‘islands’ (and relatively insular states). This discourse also tables conceptual building blocks, prerequisite analytical tools, and a guiding principle for The Earth Island Survival Game, a bounded delay supergame which models 'The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development' at the global level. We begin our exploration with an introduction to The Principle of Relative Insularity, a postulate which informs ESS for ‘island’ and ‘continental’ players alike. Next, we model ‘island’ economic development with two bio-geo-politico-economic models and respective strategies: The Mustique Co. Development Plan, and The Prince Edward Island Federal-Provincial Program for Social and Economic Advancement. These diametrically opposed strategies offer an extraordinary comparative study. One island serves as a highly descriptive model for 'The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development'; the other model informs ESS. 'The Earth Island Survival Game' serves as a remarkable learning tool, offering lessons which promote islander survival, resource holding power, cooperative behaviour, and independence by illuminating the illusive path toward sustainable economic development.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16771/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 16771.

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Date of creation: 13 Aug 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:16771

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Related research
Keywords: Non-cooperative games; evolutionary game theory; relative insularity; islands; tragedy of the commons; sustainable economic development; theory of value; resource holding power; evolutionary stable strategy; natural selection; long distance dispersal;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-7.

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