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Visitor and firm taxes versus environmental options in a dynamical context

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Author Info
Antoci, Angelo
Galeotti, Marcello
Geronazzo, Lucio

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Abstract

The main objective of the paper is to analyze the effects on economic agents’ behavior deriving from the introduction of financial activities aimed to environmental protection. The environmental protection mechanism we study should permit exchange of financial activities among citizens, firms, and Public Administration. Such a particular “financial market” is regulated by the Public Administration, but mainly fuelled by the interest of two classes of involved agents: firms and dwelling citizens. We assume that the adoption process of financial decisions is described by a two-population evolutionary game and we study the basic features of the resulting dynamics.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13667/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13667.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13667

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Related research
Keywords: Environmental options; environment preserving technologies; evolutionary games; tourism;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.

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