Proportional power is free from paradoxes
AbstractWe modify the story behind the Shapley-Shubik power index and apply it to a legislative body. The resulting proportional index may be trivial, but is free from the paradoxical behaviour observable with standard power indices. The widespread use of this index may in fact be the reason for these \paradoxes".
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Working Paper Series with number 0806.
Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision: May 2008
a priori voting power; paradox of large size; paradox of new members; paradox of quarrelling members; Gamson's Law.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-12-01 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-12-01 (Positive Political Economics)
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