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Proportional power is free from paradoxes

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Author Info
László Á. Kóczy () (Budapest Tech)

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Abstract

We modify the story behind the Shapley-Shubik power index and apply it to a legislative body. The resulting proportional index may be trivial, but is free from the paradoxical behaviour observable with standard power indices. The widespread use of this index may in fact be the reason for these \paradoxes".

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File URL: http://bmf.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/0806.pdf
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File Function: unpublished
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 0806.

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Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision: May 2008
Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0806

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Related research
Keywords: a priori voting power; paradox of large size; paradox of new members; paradox of quarrelling members; Gamson's Law.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.

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