Privatización de los monopolios naturales en el Perú: economía política, análisis institucional y desempeño

The objective of the present study is to analyze three aspects of the privatization of the so called utilities. First, from a positive perspective, we model the privatization decision by a rational government that maximizes a political agenda. Second, from an institutional perspective, we analyze the credibility problem of an economy with a weak institutional endowment. Finally, from a normative perspective, we evaluate the performance of privatized firms. In the study we compare the telecommunications industry (privatized) with the water industry (non privatized) for the period 1993-1997. Regarding the privatization decision, the study shows that the outcome in which the telecommunications industry is privatized while the water industry remains public is consistent with the positive approach to regulation (Peltzman: 1976). In this perspective, governments maximize a political agenda so that they prefer to privatize industries with a lower political sensibility to price increases. Second, given the privatization decision, and consistent with the new institutional economics (Levy and Spiller; 1994, 1996, Guasch and Spiller; 1994), the credibility problem arising in economies with a weak institutional endowment is solved with contracts which generate credibility by specifying the regulatory process but, at the same time, limit the flexibility of the regulatory policy. On the other hand, a brief review of the changes at the administrative and political aspects suggests that with almost the exception of the increment of regulatory capabilities by public officials, the institutional endowment of the economy has been weakened. Third, considering a set of indicators related to productive, allocative, distributive efficiency and access, the study shows that the performance of the Telecommunications industry is different from the performance of the water industry. The telecommunications industry shows an impressive growth of access in urban areas, and important gains in productive efficiency. However, a slow convergence in tariffs determines the increment in allocative and distributive inefficiencies, while the access growth is less dynamic in rural areas. In the industry of water we observe the opposite results, that is, lower rates of profitability and allocative inefficiencies, and growth of access in rural areas. However, we also observe limited gains in productive efficiency and access in urban areas. These differences suggest the relevance of political and institutional aspects in the performance of utilities. Length: 73 pages