Measures of central banks' independence and central banks' accountability which are based on an interpretation of their statutes provide, in themselves, no guidance for the assessment of legislative proposals. In the effectiveness of monetary policy, the crucial considerations relate to how central banks and other policymakers behave. The pattern of incentives is not determined by the statutes, which may be wholly irrelevant, and therefore one cannot discover the effectiveness of policy by inspecting the statutes. On the other hand, an assessment of the democratic acceptability of an arrangement requires a normative argument. Depending on that argument, statutory characteristics may be the crucial ones, but for the assessment to be worthwhile, the argument must be explicit.
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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number
9923.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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