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Leadership and Conflict

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  • Colin Jennings
  • Alan Hamlin

Abstract

We model the choice of leaders of groups within society, where leaders influence both the mode of interaction between groups (either peaceful compromise or costly conflict) and the outcome of these interactions. Group members may choose leaders strategically/instrumentally or they may choose leaders expressively. We characterize the equilibria of the instrumental choice model and also argue that leadership elections may overemphasise the role of expressive considerations in the choice of leader, and that this may result in increased conflict between groups.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 200.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:200

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Keywords: Leadership; Conflict; Political Process;

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RePEc Biblio mentions

As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
  1. > Schools of Economic Thought, Epistemology of Economics > Heterodox Approaches > Thermoeconomics > Bifurcations of the entropy law
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Cited by:
  1. Colin Jennings, 2008. "Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland," Working Papers, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics 0809, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
  2. Colin Jennings, 2012. "Rationalising ‘'Irrational'' Support for Political Violence," Working Papers, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics 1212, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
  3. Stefan Brandauer & Florian Englmaier, 2006. "A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series 1654, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 45(4), pages 557-573, July.
  5. Jennings, Colin & Roelfsema, Hein, 2008. "Civil conflict, federalism and strategic delegation of leadership," SIRE Discussion Papers, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) 2008-16, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  6. repec:str:wpaper:0001 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. C. Jennings & H.J. Roelfsema, 2004. "Conspicuous Public Goods and Leadership Selection," Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics 04-10, Utrecht School of Economics.
  8. Jennings, Colin, 2008. "Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland," SIRE Discussion Papers, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) 2008-30, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).

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