Wolfgang Eggert () (University of Paderborn) Jun-ichi Itaya () (Graduate School of Economics and Business Admministration and CESifo, Hokkaido University) Kazuo Mino () (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)
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We introduce a common-pool contest into a continuous-time, differential game setting to model the dynamic behavior of agents facing a trade-off between socially productive activities and appropriation. We are able to identify multiple Markov perfect equilibrium strategies that are nonlinear in a state space, thus leading the economy to a state where epartial cooperationf occurs. We show that such cooperation can be seen as a response to conflict. We also discuss the consequences of changes in the effectiveness of appropriation, the number of contenders, and the rate of time preferences on contest equilibria.
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Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number
08-27.