IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/lawarx/dcrz5.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Market as a Learning Algorithm: Consequences for Regulation and Antitrust

Author

Listed:
  • Woodcock, Ramsi

Abstract

---->The heart of the Chicago School’s attack on the antitrust laws was a skepticism about the ability of government to improve upon unregulated market outcomes. Although the attack failed to eliminate regulation or antitrust entirely, it has proven so enduringly devastating as an intellectual matter that virtually no proposal for government regulation or increased antitrust enforcement is put forward today without an attempt either to justify the proposed departure from an assumed-legitimate free market baseline or to dismiss Chicago School skepticism as an intellectual plot bankrolled by business elites. Chicago School skepticism has been so devastating because it draws sustenance from an inapt metaphor for the economy: that of evolution through natural selection. The free market is, for the Chicago School, nature itself, and all the glories of life suggest that evolution does just fine when left to its own devices, creating a powerful basis for skepticism regarding the need for government intervention in the economy. Except that evolution never did do anything to promote economic growth, so much as theft, a fact that human beings know well given their status as predators of unparalleled success. Humanity did not escape from the subsistence economics that characterizes all of evolved life until humanity started to exert control over the forces of evolution, which is to say: to regulate. A better metaphor for the economy is therefore that of a computer running an evolutionary algorithm engineered expressly to generate an optimal allocation of resources. ---->The first such algorithm embraced by humanity set evolution aside almost entirely, in favor of calculating optimal allocations directly. That was central planning, which flourished throughout the ancient world and was practiced globally right up to the 19th century. The second such algorithm embraced evolution, but sought to improve upon it by imposing a rule against theft. That was the economic liberalism practiced in the West in the late 19th century. It is also the regime favored by the Chicago School. Approached from the metaphor of the algorithm, the Chicago School’s program appears retrograde, rather than foundational, because it amounts to the position that there should be no version 2.0, no further tweaks to the algorithm. But the antitrust laws, in prohibiting behavior that degrades competitors’ products, even when the behavior does not amount to theft, improves upon the algorithm that is economic liberalism, better channeling life’s evolutionary forces toward productivity and growth, rather that destructive forms of competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Woodcock, Ramsi, 2020. "The Market as a Learning Algorithm: Consequences for Regulation and Antitrust," LawArXiv dcrz5, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:lawarx:dcrz5
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/dcrz5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/5f25b4089c9094013f486f8d/
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/dcrz5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:lawarx:dcrz5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/discover .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.