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The truncated core for games with limited aspirations

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Author Info
Anne van den Nouweland () (University of Oregon)
Luisa Carpente () (University of La Coruña)
Balbina Casas-Méndez () (University of Santiago de Compostela)
Ignacio García-Jurado () (University of Santiago de Compostela)
Abstract

We define and study games with limited aspirations. In a game with limited aspirations there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions on the core and define and study the so-called truncated core.

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File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2007-13_Nouweland_Truncated.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2007-13.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2007-13

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Branzei, R. & Dimitrov, D. & Pickl, S. & Tijs, S., 2002. "How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims?," Discussion Paper 96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Rodica Branzei & Dinko Dimitrov & Stef Tijs, 2003. "Shapley-like values for interval bankruptcy games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(9), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  3. Luisa Carpente & Balbina Casas-Mendez & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Anne van den Nouweland, 2005. "Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2005-16, University of Oregon Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-16.

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