A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications
AbstractWe construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problems of "The Tragedy of the Commons" and "R&D Spillovers in Duopoly".
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2000-2.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2000
Date of revision: 01 Feb 2000
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Cooperation; Externalities; Spillovers; Efficiency.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
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