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The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation: How to Build the Necessary Global Action in a Cost-Effective Manner

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  • Jean-Marc Burniaux
  • Jean Chateau
  • Rob Dellink
  • Romain Duval
  • Stéphanie Jamet

Abstract

This paper examines the cost of a range of national, regional and global mitigation policies and the corresponding incentives for countries to participate in ambitious international mitigation actions. The paper illustrates the scope for available instruments to strengthen these incentives and discusses ways to overcome barriers to the development of an international carbon price, based on the quantitative assessment from two global and sectorially-disaggregated CGE models. Key step towards the emergence of a single international carbon price will most likely involve the phasing out of subsidies of fossil fuel consumption and various forms of linking between regional carbon markets, ranging from direct linking of existing emission trading systems to more indirect forms through the use of sectoral crediting mechanisms. The paper discusses regulatory issues raised by the expansion of emission trading and crediting schemes as well as the complementary contribution of non-market based instruments such as the imposition of technical standards and R&D policies. Finally, the paper emphasises the important role of international transfers, not least to overcome the relatively strong economic incentives in some countries to free ride on other regions mitigation actions. While they can take various explicit or implicit forms, transfers made primarily through market mechanisms, for instance via the allocation of binding emission reduction commitments across countries, would be most cost-effective. L'économie de l'atténuation du changement climatique : comment élaborer l'action nécessaire au niveau mondial avec un rapport coût-efficacité optimal ? Cette étude examine le coût d’un éventail de mesures prises au plan national, régional et mondial pour réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre, ainsi que les incitations pour les pays à participer à des actions mondiales ambitieuses de mitigation. L’étude illustre la capacité des instruments disponibles à renforcer ces incitations et discute des moyens pour surmonter les barrières au développement d’un prix mondial du carbone, sur la base d’une évaluation quantitative à partir de deux modèles d’équilibre général désagrégés au plan sectoriel. Parmi les étapes essentielles vers l’émergence d’un prix mondial unique du carbone on trouvera vraisemblablement la suppression des subventions à la consommation des combustibles fossiles ainsi que des formes diverses d'intégration des marchés du carbone régionaux, allant des couplages directs des systèmes d’échange de droits d’émission à des formes plus indirectes par le biais d’un mécanisme de crédits d’émission. Cette étude examine les questions de réglementation soulevées par l’expansion des systèmes d’échange de droits et de crédits d’émissions ainsi que le rôle complémentaire politique de R&D.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/224074334782
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by OECD Publishing in its series OECD Economics Department Working Papers with number 701.

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Date of creation: 02 Jun 2009
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Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:701-en

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Keywords: sectoral approach; deforestation; carbon leakage; climate change; climate policy; energy subsidies; crediting mechanism; changement climatique; fuites de carbone; politique climatique; approche sectorielle; déforestation; intégration des marchés du carbone;

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Cited by:
  1. ZhongXiang Zhang, 2012. "Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns and Border Carbon Adjustments," Working Papers 2012.80, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Valentina Bossetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 702, OECD Publishing.
  3. Bohringer, Christoph & Rutherford, Thomas F. & Springmannc, Marco, 2013. "Clean-development investments : an incentive-compatible CGE modeling framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6720, The World Bank.
  4. Li, Aijun & Lin, Boqiang, 2013. "Comparing climate policies to reduce carbon emissions in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 667-674.
  5. Christoph Böhringer & Thomas F. Rutherford & Marco Springmann, 2013. "Clean-Development Investments: An Incentive-Compatible CGE Modelling Framework," Working Papers V-354-13, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2013.
  6. Jiang, Zhujun & Tan, Jijun, 2013. "How the removal of energy subsidy affects general price in China: A study based on input–output model," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 599-606.
  7. Jang Schiltz & Marc Boissaux, 2011. "Practical weight-constrained conditioned portfolio optimization using risk aversion indicator signals," CREA Discussion Paper Series 11-12, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
  8. Breisinger, Clemens & Engelke, Wilfried & Ecker, Olivier, 2011. "Petroleum subsidies in Yemen: Leveraging reform for development," IFPRI discussion papers 1071, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  9. BRECHET, Thierry & meniere, Yann & PICARD, Pierre M., 2012. "The clean development mechanism in a global carbon market," CORE Discussion Papers 2012040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model," Working Papers 2009.64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  11. Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2010. "International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation," Papers of Peter Cramton 10icg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2010.
  12. Lin, Boqiang & Jiang, Zhujun, 2011. "Estimates of energy subsidies in China and impact of energy subsidy reform," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 273-283, March.
  13. Carlo Carraro, 2009. "The Road to Copenhagen: What Agreement Can Actually Be Effective and Stable? by Carlo Carraro," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 10(3), pages 30-36, October.
  14. Li, Aijun & Zhang, Aizhen & Cai, Hongbo & Li, Xingfeng & Peng, Shishen, 2013. "How large are the impacts of carbon-motivated border tax adjustments on China and how to mitigate them?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 927-934.
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