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Sophisticated Play by Idiosyncratic Agents

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Author Info

  • Myatt, D.P.
  • Wallace, C.

Abstract

The payoffs of a symmetric 2x2 coordination game are perturbed by agent-specific heterogeneity. Individuals observe a (possibly sampled) history of play, which forms the initial hypothesis for an opponent's behaviour. Seedings beliefs in this manner, they iteratively reason toward a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Realised actions augment history and context evolves. Both risk-dominance and generalised risk-dominance determine equilibrium selection as heterogeneity vanishes. When sampling is sufficiently incomplete, the risk-dominant equilibrium is played irrespective of the history observed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 1999-w1.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:1999-w1

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/

Related research

Keywords: GAME THEORY ; ECONOMETRICS;

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