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Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Their Impact on Managerial Value

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Author Info
Del Brio, Esther B. () (Departamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca)
Maia-Ramires, Elida () (Departamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca)

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Abstract

Previous studies have cast doubts on the effectiveness of the application of corporate governance codes in Continental-European countries, due to their Anglo-Saxon orientation. For this reason, we chose a Continental-European country with an Anglo-Saxon orientated code, such as Spain, and analyse which of the recommendations proposed in the Spanish Olivencia Code have positive effects on the value of the firm. We furthermore use panel data estimation to analyse this relationship as well as the impact on firm’s value of other corporate governance related variables, such as the quality of audit reports, the magnitude of directors remuneration, the reporting on director remuneration or the firm size. Results suggest a positive relationship between the variables of execution of good corporate governance practices and the value of the company. There is also evidence that the more transparent the company is and the more favourable audit reports they obtain, the better both the managerial performance and the firm’s value. Among the recommendations, it is found that the most relevant aspects are transparency and the quality of the audit report.

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Paper provided by Interuniversitary Doctorate Program "New Trends on Business Administration", Universities of Valladolid, Burgos and Salamanca (Spain). Programa de Doctorado Interuniversitario "Nuevas Tendencias en Dirección de Empresas", Universidades de Valladolid, Burgos y Salamanca (España). in its series Documentos de Trabajo "Nuevas Tendencias en Dirección de Empresas". Working Papers "New Trends on Business Administration". with number 2005-09.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ntd:wpaper:2005-09

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Related research
Keywords: corporate governance code compliance director remuneration panel data.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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    Other versions:
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