Este trabajo proporciona evidencia empírica sobre los determinantes de los pagos variables que realizan los franquiciados a sus franquiciadores. Los resultados son consistentes con las teorías que consideran que estos pagos responden al objetivo de crear incentivos para aliviar los potenciales problemas de riesgo moral bilateral que afectan a ambas partes de la relación. This article provides evidence on the determinants of the ongoing variable payments transferred by the franchisees to the franchisors. The results support for double-sided moral hazard explanations for franchise contracts.
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