Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Manipulating an ordering

Contents:

Author Info

  • Conal Duddy
  • Juan Perote-Pena
  • Asjley Piggins

    (Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Galway)

Abstract

It is well known that many social decision procedures are manipulable through strategic behaviour. Typically, the decision procedures considered in the literature are social choice correspondences. In this paper we investigate the problem of constructing a social welfare function that is non-manipulable. In this context, individuals attempt to manipulate a social ordering as opposed to a social choice. Using techniques from an ordinal version of fuzzy set theory, we introduce a class of ordinally fuzzy binary relations of which exact binary relations are a special case. Operating within this family enables us to prove an impossibility theorem. This theorem states that all non-manipulable social welfare functions are dictatorial, provided that they are not constant. This theorem generalizes the one in Perote-Pena and Piggins (Perote-Pena, J., Piggins, A., 2007. Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules. J. Math. Econ., vol. 43, p. 564 - p. 580). We conclude by considering several ways of circumventing this impossibility theorem.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=148
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=148 [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://www.nuigalway.ie/business-public-policy-law/cairnes/subjectareas/economics/resrch/paper.php?pid=148). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Srinivas Raghavendra)
File Function: First version, 2009
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=148
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=148 [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://www.nuigalway.ie/business-public-policy-law/cairnes/subjectareas/economics/resrch/paper.php?pid=148). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Srinivas Raghavendra)
File Function: Revised version, 2009
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National University of Ireland Galway, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0141.

as in new window
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision: 2009
Handle: RePEc:nig:wpaper:0141

Contact details of provider:
Postal: St. Anthony's College, Newcastle Road, Galway
Phone: +353-91 524411 ext. 2501
Fax: +353-91 524130
Web page: http://economics.nuigalway.ie
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Ordinal fuzziness; social welfare function; manipulation Algorithmic Trading; MACD;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ján Palguta, 2011. "Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 324-345, November.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nig:wpaper:0141. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Srinivas Raghavendra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.