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On the Regulation of Fee Structures in Mutual Funds

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Author Info
Sanjiv Ranjan Das
Rangarajan K. Sundaram
Abstract

We offer an alternative framework for the analysis of mutual funds and use it to examine the rationale behind existing regulations that require mutual fund advisor fees to be of the fulcrum' variety. We find little justification for the regulations. Indeed, we find that asymmetric incentive fees' in which the advisor receives a flat fee plus a bonus for exceeding a benchmark index provide Pareto-dominant outcomes with a lower level of equilibrium volatility. Our model also offers some insight into fee structures actually in use in the asset-management industry. We find that when leveraging is not permitted and the fee structure must be of the fulcrum variety, the equilibrium fee in our model is a flat fee with no performance component; if asymmetric incentive fees are allowed and leveraging is permitted the equilibrium fee is an incentive fee with a large performance component. These predictions match observed fee structures in the mutual fund industry and the hedge fund industry, respectively.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 6639.

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Date of creation: Jul 1998
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6639

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  1. Juan-Pedro Gómez & Tridib Sharma, 2003. "Portfolio Delegation under Short-selling Constraints," Economics Working Papers 695, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ping Hu & Jayant Kale & Ajay Subramanian, 2003. "Compensation, Career Concerns, and Relative Risk Choices by Mutual Fund Managers: Theory and Evidence," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000349, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Franklin R. Edward, 1999. "Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 189-210, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Palomino, Frédéric & Prat, Andrea, 1999. "Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Uday Rajan & Sanjay Srivastava, 2000. "Portfolio Delegation with Limited Liability," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1503, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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