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The Simplest Test of Inflation Target Credibility

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Author Info
Lars E.O. Svensson

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Abstract

A simple test of inflation target credibility is constructed by subtracting the maximum and minimum inflation rates consistent with the inflation targets from the yields to maturity on nominal bonds. This results in a target-consistent range of real yields on nominal bonds. If expected real yields, or market real interest rates on real bonds if such are available, fall outside the range of target- consistent real yields, credibility is rejected. Two concepts of credibility, called absolute credibility and credibility in expectation, are distinguished. The inflation targets of Canada, New Zealand and Sweden are examined with convenient diagrams over yields to maturity and forward interest rates.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4604.

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Date of creation: Dec 1993
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4604

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Determination of Interest Rates; Term Structure of Interest Rates
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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  1. Gianni Amisano & Marco Tronzano, 2005. "Assessing ECB?s Credibility During the First Years of the Eurosystem: A Bayesian Empirical Investigation," Working Papers ubs0512, University of Brescia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lars E.O. Svensson, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," NBER Working Papers 5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Diana N. Weymark, 2001. "Inflation Targeting, Announcements, and Imperfect Credibility," Working Papers 0124, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Apr 2002. [Downloadable!]
  4. Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2000. "Uncovering financial markets' beliefs about inflation targets," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(5), pages 483-512. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2005. "Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp105, IIIS. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Carl E. Walsh, 1995. "Recent Central-Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 237-252 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  7. Robert Amano & Paul Fenton & David Tessier & Simon van Norden, 1996. "The credibility of monetary policy: a survey of the literature with some simple applications to Caanda," Meeting papers 9610001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bharat Trehan, 1995. "The credibility of inflation targets," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jan 6. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kursat Kunter & Norbert Janssen, 2002. "Credibility Of Monetary Regimes : Is Inflation Targeting Different?," Discussion Papers 0201, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. [Downloadable!]
  10. Richard T. Freeman & Jonathan L. Willis, 1995. "Targeting inflation in the 1990s: recent challenges," International Finance Discussion Papers 525, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  11. Michael D. Bordo & Lars Jonung, 1996. "Monetary Regimes, Inflation And Monetary Reform: An Essay in Honor of Axel Leijonhufvud," Departmental Working Papers 199407, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Lars E.O. Svensson, 1995. "The Swedish Experience of an Inflation Target," NBER Working Papers 4985, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers 06, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 1997. [Downloadable!]
  14. M. Lossani & P. Natale, & P. Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers 9707, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
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