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Fiscal Federalism and the Role of the Income Tax

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  • Roger H. Gordon

Abstract

This paper rethinks the design of the income tax by assuming that the objective of the tax is not to redistribute from rich to poor but instead to provide some insurance to individuals against the uncertainties they face in their future earnings, a motivation for the tax proposed in Buchanan (1976). The income tax provides insurance by collecting money on net from individuals to the extent they end up doing well to finance net transfers to them when they end up doing badly. Individuals differ in the amount of future risks they face. These heterogeneous tastes for insurance provide a rationale for states to offer heterogeneous tax/transfer programs, each state attracting a different clientele in the population. Given the ease of household migration, state tax policies generate fiscal externalities to other states. The paper explores as well possible Federal interventions to improve on the equilibrium choices states make for their tax policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger H. Gordon, 2023. "Fiscal Federalism and the Role of the Income Tax," NBER Working Papers 31755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31755
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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey Clemens & Stan Veuger, 2023. "Intergovernmental Grants and Policy Competition: Concepts, Institutions, and Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: Policy Responses to Tax Competition, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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