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Do Collateral Sanctions Work? Evidence from the IRS’ Passport Certification and Revocation Process

Author

Listed:
  • Paul R. Organ
  • Alex Ruda
  • Joel Slemrod
  • Alex Turk

Abstract

Penalties for tax evasion are typically financial, but many jurisdictions also utilize collateral sanctions that deny access to some government-provided service. To learn about the effectiveness of such penalties, we examine a U.S. policy restricting passport access for taxpayers with substantial tax debt, known as “certification.” We find an immediate and strong positive effect on compliance actions when a passport request is denied. We then take advantage of randomization during the policy rollout to identify the direct compliance effect of certification, and find smaller but non-trivial effects whose heterogeneity is consistent with measures of taxpayers’ value of having a passport.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul R. Organ & Alex Ruda & Joel Slemrod & Alex Turk, 2021. "Do Collateral Sanctions Work? Evidence from the IRS’ Passport Certification and Revocation Process," NBER Working Papers 29029, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29029
    Note: PE
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w29029.pdf
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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