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When Do Environmental Externalities Have Electoral Consequences? Evidence from Fracking

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Listed:
  • Judson Boomhower

Abstract

The electoral salience of some issues may diminish when one politician has authority over many policy areas. This study measures the role of environmental regulation in concurrent elections for governors and specialized energy regulators in two U.S. states. I first show that while both offices can influence environmental and energy policies, quantitative analysis of campaign news coverage reveals clear differences in the importance of these issues in the two races. Next, I use geologic variation in earthquakes caused by oil and gas production to measure the electoral consequences of a costly environmental externality. There are measurable effects only in the energy regulator race. These results are consistent with theories of issue bundling. Finally, the unbundling effects that I measure appear to be themselves limited by voter attentiveness and partisanship.

Suggested Citation

  • Judson Boomhower, 2021. "When Do Environmental Externalities Have Electoral Consequences? Evidence from Fracking," NBER Working Papers 28857, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28857
    Note: EEE POL
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • Q35 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Hydrocarbon Resources
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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