A Brief History of Regulations Regarding Financial Markets in the United States: 1789 to 2009
AbstractIn the United States today, the system of financial regulation is complex and fragmented. Responsibility to regulate the financial services industry is split between about a dozen federal agencies, hundreds of state agencies, and numerous industry-sponsored self-governing associations. Regulatory jurisdictions often overlap, so that most financial firms report to multiple regulators; but gaps exist in the supervisory structure, so that some firms report to few, and at times, no regulator. The overlapping jumble of standards; laws; and federal, state, and private jurisdictions can confuse even the most sophisticated student of the system. This article explains how that confusion arose. The story begins with the Constitutional Convention and the foundation of our nation. Our founding fathers fragmented authority over financial markets between federal and state governments. That legacy survives today, complicating efforts to create a financial system that can function effectively during the twenty-first century.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17443.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
- N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
- N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
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