On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms
AbstractThis paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemloyment rate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2001-22.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
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INFLATION ; CENTRAL BANKS;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
- E30 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
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