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Electoral Competition with Uncertainty Averse Parties

Author

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  • Sophie Bade

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

Abstract

The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result.

Suggested Citation

  • Sophie Bade, 2010. "Electoral Competition with Uncertainty Averse Parties," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_22, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_22
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    File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_22online.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Sophie Bade, 2016. "Divergent platforms," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(4), pages 561-580, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Uncertainty Aversion; Multiple Priors; Median Voter; Electoral Competition over many Issues;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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