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Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

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Author Info
Edmond Baranes
Jean-Christophe Poudou

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Abstract

This paper examines to what extend the conventional doctrine saying that "it is easier to collude among equals" remains true in a context of vertically related industry. Using a model of a differentiated duopoly market with an essential facility, we show that cost-based access price regulation (i.e. more cost symmetry in the industry) may affect sustainability of tacit collusion.

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File URL: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr/Cahiers/cahier260109.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 in its series Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) with number 2009.26.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2009.26

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, LASER, Av. de la Mer - Espace Richter, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2, France
Web page: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr
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Related research
Keywords: Collusion; access; regulation; vertical structure;

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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