Pseudo-Generic Products and Mergers in Pharmaceutical Markets
AbstractThis paper fills the gap in the theoretical literature concerning mergers between brand-name and generic laboratories in pharmaceutical markets. To prevent generic firms from increasing their market share, some brand-name furms produce generics themselves, called pseudo-generics, enabling them to set up barriers to entry. We develop this topic by considering the pseudo-generics production as a mergers.catalyst. We show, in a duopoly model with substitutable goods, in which a brand-name firm and a generic firm compete à la Cournot, that a brand-name company always has an incentive to purchase its competitor. The key insight of this paper is that the brand-name laboratory can increase its merger gain by producing pseudo-generics beforehand. In some cases, pseudo-generics would not otherwise be produced.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 in its series Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) with number 2006.18.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, LASER, Rue Raymond Dugrand - Espace Richter, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2, France
Web page: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr
More information through EDIRC
Mergers; Pharmaceutical Market; Pseudo-Generics.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-04-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2006-04-22 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-HEA-2006-04-22 (Health Economics)
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