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Strict Nash equilibria in large games with strict single crossing in types and actions

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  • Ennio Bilancini

    ()

  • Leonardo Boncinelli

    ()

Abstract

In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless, action spaces are second countable, and payoffs functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Our main finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and discuss the relevant consequences of our result.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics in its series Center for Economic Research (RECent) with number 045.

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Length: pages 7
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mod:recent:045

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Related research

Keywords: atomless; single crossing; strict Nash; pure Nash; monotone Nash;

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