IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mnb/opaper/2014-115.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Banking union through Hungarian eyes - The MNB’s assessment of a possible close cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Anikó Szombati

    (Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary))

  • Kornél Kisgergely

    (Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary))

Abstract

Legislation laying down the institutional system of the Banking Union was finalised in April 2014. In accordance with the regulations, non-euro area Member States, including Hungary, may notify the ECB at any time if they wish to participate in the common system even before the euro is adopted. However, in its existing form, the single supervisory and crisis management mechanism has not achieved the initial goal, i.e. the separation of the stability of national banking systems and the fiscal capacity of Member States and the elimination of interdependencies. In addition, close cooperation implies weaker powers than those provided by actual membership, and the separation of central bank and supervisory functions carries risks in non-euro area countries. By contrast, the attraction of Banking Union membership lies in the opportunity to join a uniform European system, a wider analyst base and ultimately, the “ammunition” of the EUR 55 billion available for crisis management in comparison to the contributions coming solely from the Hungarian banking system. In October 2013, a single supervisory system integrated into the central bank was set up in Hungary, and the institutional system of the domestic resolution mechanism will be complete by the end of 2014. Therefore, until the actual launch of the Banking Union and the commencement of payments into the Resolution Fund in 2016, it is reasonable to put the decision to join on hold; indeed, such a decision should be made in light of several factors presented in this study.

Suggested Citation

  • Anikó Szombati & Kornél Kisgergely, 2014. "Banking union through Hungarian eyes - The MNB’s assessment of a possible close cooperation," MNB Occasional Papers 2014/115, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
  • Handle: RePEc:mnb:opaper:2014/115
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/banking-union-mnb-op-115.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zsolt Darvas & Guntram B. Wolff, 2013. "Should Non-Euro Area Countries Join the Single Supervisory Mechanism?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 141-163, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Näther, Maria & Vollmer, Uwe, 2019. "National versus supranational bank regulation: Gains and losses of joining a banking union," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-18.
    2. Belke, Ansgar & Dobrzańska, Anna & Gros, Daniel & Smaga, Paweł, 2016. "(When) should a non-euro country join the banking union?," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 14(PA), pages 4-19.
    3. Vollmer Uwe, 2016. "The Asymmetric Implementation of the European Banking Union (EBU): Consequences for Financial Stability," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 50(1), pages 7-26, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ida-Maria Weirsøe Fallesen, 2015. "The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis?," Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36, European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe.
    2. Lisa Coiffard, 2018. "Independence of central banks after the crisis - focus on Hungary," IWE Working Papers 242, Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    3. Zsolt Darvas & Guntram B. Wolff, 2013. "Should Non-Euro Area Countries Join the Single Supervisory Mechanism?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 141-163, June.
    4. Svend E Hougaard Jensen & Dirk Schoenmaker, 0. "Should Denmark and Sweden Join the Banking Union?," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 317-326.
    5. Näther, Maria & Vollmer, Uwe, 2019. "National versus supranational bank regulation: Gains and losses of joining a banking union," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-18.
    6. Belke, Ansgar & Dobrzańska, Anna & Gros, Daniel & Smaga, Paweł, 2016. "(When) should a non-euro country join the banking union?," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 14(PA), pages 4-19.
    7. Tröger, Tobias H., 2013. "The single supervisory mechanism - Panacea of quack banking regulation? Preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement," SAFE Working Paper Series 27, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    8. Mérő, Katalin, 2019. "Érdemes-e csatlakozniuk az európai bankunióhoz az euróövezeten kívüli tagállamoknak? [Is it worth non-euro member-states joining the European Banking Union?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(5), pages 497-520.
    9. Vollmer Uwe, 2016. "The Asymmetric Implementation of the European Banking Union (EBU): Consequences for Financial Stability," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 50(1), pages 7-26, June.
    10. Donath Liliana & Mihutescu Cerna Veronica, 2017. "Alternative Views on the Participation of Non-Euro Zone Countries at the Bank Union," Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Oeconomica, Sciendo, vol. 62(1), pages 3-19, April.
    11. Gregorio Impavido & Mr. Heinz Rudolph & Mr. Luigi Ruggerone, 2013. "Bank Funding in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe Post Lehman: A “New Normal”?," IMF Working Papers 2013/148, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Zaman, Gheorghe & Georgescu, George, 2014. "Challenges of bank lending in Romania on short, medium and long-term," MPRA Paper 60271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Ludek Kouba & Michal Madr & Danuse Nerudova & Petr Rozmahel, 2016. "Policy Autonomy, Coordination or Harmonization in the Persistently Heterogeneous European Union?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 1, pages 53-71, March.
    14. María J. Nieto & Dalvinder Singh, 2021. "Incentive compatible relationship between the ERM II and close cooperation in the Banking Union: the cases of Bulgaria and Croatia," Occasional Papers 2117, Banco de España.
    15. Darvas, Zsolt & Schoenmaker, Dirk & Véron, Nicolas, 2016. "Reforms to the European Union Financial Supervisory and Regulatory Architecture and Their Implications for Asia," ADBI Working Papers 615, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    16. María Cantero Sáiz & Sergio Sanfilippo Azofra & Begoña Torre Olmo, 2019. "The single supervision mechanism and contagion between bank and sovereign risk," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 67-106, February.
    17. David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, 2013. "Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe's Banks and ‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51, pages 103-123, September.
    18. Mario Sarcinelli, 2013. "The European Banking Union: Will It Be a True Union without Risk Sharing?," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 66(265), pages 137-167.
    19. Jaroslaw Beldowski & Agnieszka Slomka-Golebiowska, 2016. "Banking Union as an institutional response of the European Union to the financial crisis 2008–2009," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 15(2), pages 153-165, June.
    20. Elisabetta Montanaro, 2016. "The process towards centralisation of the European financial supervisory architecture: The case of the Banking Union," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 69(277), pages 135-172.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking Union; close cooperation; SSM; SRM; financial crisis management;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mnb:opaper:2014/115. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lorant Kaszab (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mnbgvhu.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.